Reflections on the History and Future of the Voting Rights Act in the Wake of Shelby County by Deale, Franke
City University of New York Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 1
2013
Reflections on the History and Future of the Voting
Rights Act in the Wake of Shelby County
Franke Deale
CUNY School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
The CUNY Law Review is published by the Office of Library Services at the City University of New York. For more information please contact
cunylr@law.cuny.edu.
Recommended Citation
Franke Deale, Reflections on the History and Future of the Voting Rights Act in the Wake of Shelby County, 17 CUNY L. Rev. (2013).
Available at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr/vol17/iss1/10
CUNY Law Review Footnote Forum 
August 15, 2013  
 
Recommended citation: 
Frank Deale, Reflections on the History and Future of the Voting Rights Act in the Wake of 
Shelby County, 17 CUNY L. REV. F. 1 (2013), http://www.cunylawreview.org/696/ 
[https://perma.cc/NWZ8-2FGL]. 
 
 
REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN THE WAKE OF SHELBY COUNTY 
 
Frank Deale* 
 
I. 
 
At the conclusion of America’s deadliest military conflict, the United 
States Congress sought to reconstruct a nation torn apart by civil war by 
enacting a program of radical social change designed to eliminate the legal 
disabilities shouldered by the newly freed African-American male 
population. Included in the numerous proposals was a series of 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution: the 13th Amendment would abolish 
the institution of slavery; the 14th Amendment would provide equal 
protection and due process under law to those with former slave status; and 
the 15th Amendment would enable them to protect these rights via a right to 
vote, unencumbered by “race” or “color” discrimination. The Congress was 
empowered to enforce this provision with appropriate legislation. 
Less than 50 years after the enactment of these historic provisions, a 
substantial number of African-Americans went to polling stations in the 
state of Alabama, the home of Shelby County, seeking to register as voters 
for an upcoming election. In flagrant violation of the language in the 
Constitution, they were turned away because of their race. Undaunted, over 
5,000 of them joined a civil case to enforce the Constitution, which was 
heard by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court correctly 
understood the gist of the plaintiffs’ complaint, which was that “the great 
mass of the white population intends to keep the blacks from voting.”1 Yet, 
                                                
* Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. Professor Deale has taught on the faculty 
of Rutgers Law School, Newark, and for 14 years was a member of the staff of the Center 
for Constitutional Rights, where he served successively as staff attorney, Associate Legal 
Director, and Legal Director. Among the classes he teaches at CUNY School of Law are 
Federal Courts, Civil Procedure, and Civil Rights. 
1 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 487 (1903). 
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notwithstanding the stark nature of the facts, the Court denied relief, 
concluding that: 
 
If the conspiracy and the intent exist, a name on a piece of paper will not 
defeat them. Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that State 
by officers of the court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff could get 
from equity would be an empty form. Apart from damages to the 
individual, relief from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the 
people of a state and the State itself, must be given by them or by the 
legislative and political department of the Government of the United 
States.2 
 
Decades after Giles was decided, the country witnessed a Second 
Reconstruction3—a tremendous upsurge of civil rights activism focused on 
the rights to vote and to quality education, housing, and jobs4—which 
forced all three branches of government to respond in the face of violent 
white racism and resistance. Among the numerous congressional responses 
was the enactment of an historic statute designed to carry out the mandate 
of the 15th Amendment. The Voting Rights Act of 19655 (“VRA” or “the 
Act”) did two things: First, under Section 2, it provided a cause of action to 
allow the United States government and private parties to file suit in federal 
court challenging denials or abridgements of the right to vote that were 
based on race or color.6 Second, recognizing the sheer volume of 
abridgments of the right to vote taking place in states where the deepest 
remnants of slavery existed, and the cost and strategic difficulties of 
bringing such individual actions, the Act included two additional 
provisions: Section 4,7 which established a formula for determining where 
the most consistent egregious violations were taking place, and Section 5, 
which required those jurisdictions captured by Section 4 to get future voting 
changes approved beforehand by the United States Government to assure 
that they would not deny or abridge the right to vote based on race or 
                                                                                                                       
 
2 Id. 
3 Cf. MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND 
RECONSTRUCTION AND BEYOND IN BLACK AMERICA (2007).   
4 See generally DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 
AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (1978); BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, FREE AT LAST TO 
VOTE: THE ALABAMA ORIGINS OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2007); Bridge to 
Freedom (1987) (Episode 6 of Eyes on the Prize: America’s Civil Rights Years 1954-
1985). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. 
6 Id. § 1973(a). 
7 Id. § 1973b(b). 
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color.8 Congress recognized the onerous nature of the requirements, by 
making them subject to continued renewal9 to assure that they were 
achieving their goals. Congress also included a provision that allowed 
jurisdictions to “bail out” of the coverage and the preclearance requirement, 
if coverage was no longer warranted by existing circumstances.10 
No one disputes that the 1965 VRA served its purposes well. When 
Congress renewed the Act in 2006, it stated that “[s]ignificant progress has 
been made in eliminating first generation barriers experienced by minority 
voters, including increased numbers of registered minority voters, minority 
voter turnout, and minority representation in Congress, State legislatures, 
and local elected offices.”11 The House Report elaborated upon this success, 
stating that “the number of African-Americans who are registered and who 
turn out to cast ballots has increased significantly over the last 40 years, 
particularly since 1982,” and added that “[i]n some circumstances, 
minorities register to vote and cast ballots at levels that surpass those of 
white voters.”12 The Report explained that there have been “significant 
increases in the number of African-Americans serving in elected offices” 
and a 1,000-percent increase since 1965 in the number of African-American 
elected officials in the six states originally covered by the VRA.13 
 
II. 
 
Writing for the majority of the Court in Shelby County, Ala. v. 
Holder, Justice Roberts, speaking of improvements in African-American 
voting power since the passage of the VRA, stated that “there is no doubt 
that these improvements are in large part because of the Voting Rights Act 
. . . . [which] has proved immensely successful at redressing racial 
discrimination and integrating the voting process.”14 Yet in that same 
opinion, the Court rendered a devastating blow to this essential pivot to the 
Second Reconstructionist program, knocking out the formula for 
ascertaining which jurisdictions would be subjected to the preclearance 
regime. 
                                                
8 Id. § 1973c(a). 
9 Congress renewed these provisions in 1970, 1975, 1982 and in 2006. Shelby Cty. v. 
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2620–21 (2013). In its most recent 2006 renewal, the 
reauthorizations passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 390 to 33, and the Senate 
by a vote of 98–0. Id. at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
10 42 U.S.C. §1973b(a) (citing § 2(b)(1), 120 Stat. 577). 
11 Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (quoting H.R. Rep. 109–478, at 12 (2006)). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 2626. 
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Even when considering the stunning success of the scheme enacted in 
1965, it was not a surprise to close observers that the Court took this 
extraordinary, unnecessary, and unjustified step. One of the earliest indica-
tions that a majority of the Court would closely scrutinize the VRA for con-
stitutional defects appeared in the case of City of Boerne v. Flores,15 where 
the Court, despite having earlier concluded that congressional exercises of 
its powers under the Reconstruction Amendments were “plenary,”16 for the 
first time imposed limits on the extent of congressional power, holding that 
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment could only be used for remedial, as 
opposed to substantive purposes—“congruence and proportionality” was 
required between the Act and any harm that Congress was seeking to 
remedy.17 South Carolina v. Katzenbach18 held that Congress has “full 
remedial power” under the 15th Amendment, and “may use any rational 
means to effectuate the Constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in 
voting.”19 But the Court in Boerne, although citing to a number of voting 
rights cases in discussing the powers of Congress under the Reconstruction 
Amendments, did not cite to any of the decisions concerning Section 5 that 
were decided after the 1982 congressional extension of the Act.20 In a post-
Boerne case construing Section 5 in 1999, the Court stated that the 
provision raised “substantial federalism concerns,” yet held that any 
intrusion on state sovereignty was permitted by the 15th Amendment.21 But 
then in the next term the Court applied a restrictive reading to the provision 
because, according to the Court, to do otherwise would “exacerbate the 
substantial federalism costs that preclearance already exacts . . . perhaps to 
the extent of raising concerns about Section 5’s constitutionality.”22 This 
language in the Court’s opinions, though of no binding legal effect, sent 
subtle signals to lawyers and covered jurisdictions seeking to get the Act 
declared unconstitutional. 
Senator Edward Kennedy queried Chief Justice John Roberts about the 
VRA when Roberts was up for confirmation to the Supreme Court in 2005. 
He did so because Roberts served as an attorney in the Office of White 
House counsel during the Reagan Administration when the VRA was up for 
reauthorization in 1982, and while there, wrote a number of memos and 
opinion articles arguing for a weakening of the Act.23 In one of the memos, 
                                                
15 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
16 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
17 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
18 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
19 Id. at 324. 
20 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507. 
21 Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266, 282–85 (1999). 
22 Reno v. Bossier Parish School Parish Board, 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000). 
23 Adam Serwer, Chief Justice Roberts’ Long War Against the Voting Rights Act, 
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discussing the reauthorization of Section 2 of the statute, he stated that 
voting rights violations “should not be too easy to prove since they provide 
a basis for the most intrusive interference imaginable.”24 Statements such as 
this led to a fairly intense round of questioning of Roberts by Senator 
Kennedy, who ultimately voted against his nomination.25 
Roberts was Chief Justice when the Court agreed to hear Northwestern 
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder26 (“NAMUDNO”) a 
case arising amidst a purely Supreme Court-generated controversy around 
the constitutionality of Section 527 and a number of pending challenges in 
the lower federal courts.  Ironically, the plaintiff in NAMUDNO deserved 
considerable sympathy. A small utility district in the covered jurisdiction of 
the state of Texas, NAMUDNO was governed by a board of five members, 
and required to preclear all election changes under Section 5, even though 
there was no history of race discrimination in the district. But it could not 
“bail out” out of coverage because it did not register its own voters.28 
Roberts’ opinion for the Court left little doubt that he felt the statute was 
unconstitutional. The gist of the problem, according to Roberts, was not that 
the “remedy” of preclearance was not “congruent and proportional” to the 
harm it was seeking to redress. The extensive legislative record prepared by 
Congress in 2006 precluded such a ruling,29 and even Justice Roberts was 
                                                                                                                       
MOTHER JONES (Feb. 27, 2013, 4:01 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/02/ 
john-roberts-long-war-against-voting-rights-act. 
24 Id. 
25 John Perr, John Roberts Completes 30 Year Mission to Kill Voting Rights Act, 
DAILY KOS (June 25, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/06/25/ 
1218903/-John-Roberts-completes-30-year-mission-to-kill-Voting-Rights-Act. 
26 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
27 Cf. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF 
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 584 (4th ed. 2012). 
28 Rather than see the bailout provision as a means of providing flexibility to the 
statute, Roberts displayed his antagonism to the entire statutory enterprise by describing it 
as a “nullity” because, at the time, only 17 of the more than 12,000 covered jurisdictions 
had successfully bailed out of coverage. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 211 (2009). 
29 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in dissent, “The House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees held 21 hearings, heard from scores of witnesses, received a number of 
investigative reports and other written documentation of continuing discrimination in 
covered jurisdictions. In all, the legislative record Congress compiled filled more than 
15,000 pages. The compilation presents countless ‘examples of flagrant racial 
discrimination’ since the last reauthorization; Congress also brought to light systematic 
evidence that ‘intentional racial discrimination in voting remains so serious and widespread 
in covered jurisdictions that section 5 preclearance is still needed.’” Id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, 
J. dissenting) (quoting Shelby Cty. Ala. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). 
Congress went on to find that “second generation barriers constructed to prevent minority 
voters from fully participating in the electoral process” continued to exist, as well as 
racially polarized voting in the covered jurisdictions, which increased the political 
vulnerability of racial and language minorities in those jurisdictions. Extensive “evidence 
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compelled to acknowledge that Congress had “amassed a sizeable 
record.”30 Rather, the opinion suggested that the Section 5 pre-clearance 
requirement violated a principle of “equal sovereignty,” a novel idea 
buttressed by only two citations, neither of which provided any illumination 
as to the meaning of such a doctrine or why it posed constitutional issues 
for Section 5.31 The opinion referred to Section 5 as an extraordinary 
assertion of federal power and cited dicta from a number of cases to support 
this view, as if that alone made it unconstitutional; but the Court could not 
avoid the telling fact that it had upheld the constitutionality of each one of 
the numerous reauthorizations.32 The Court devoted barely a paragraph to 
the coverage formula, suggesting that covered and non-covered jurisdictions 
were treated in a radically different way, while the Court saw the evidence 
of discrimination as suggesting more similarity than difference.33 However, 
the Court concluded, 7–1, that rather than decide the issue of 
constitutionality, it was better to read the statute in such a way as to allow 
bailout by covered districts, even though they didn’t register their own 
voters.34 
                                                                                                                       
of continued discrimination,” Congress concluded, “clearly showed the continued need for 
Federal oversight” in covered jurisdictions. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). The overall record demonstrated to the federal lawmakers that, “without the 
continuation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 protections, racial and language minority 
citizens will be deprived of the opportunity to exercise their right to vote, or will have their 
votes diluted, undermining the significant gains made by minorities in the last 40 
years.” Id. 
30 557 U.S. at 205. 
31 The cases relied upon were United States v. Louisiana, 361 U.S. 1 (1960), which 
raised the question whether the Submerged Lands Act granted to Texas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, or Alabama the submerged lands in the Gulf of Mexico within three marine 
leagues from their coasts. In holding that the Act did not grant Louisiana, Mississippi or 
Alabama any rights in submerged lands beyond three geographic miles from their coasts, 
The language of the opinion says no more than that states were entitled to “equal 
sovereignty upon their admission” to the Union. Id. at 16. Also relied upon was Pollard v. 
Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845), which dealt with navigable waters in Alabama, standing for 
the same principle, and Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (1869), a case decided in 1869, seeking 
to determine the proper ownership of bonds. None of these cases is of the slightest 
assistance in determining what an “equal sovereignty” principle is, or how such a principle 
relates to Congressional power under the 15th Amendment. 
32 NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 200. 
33 Id. at 204. 
34 Id. at 211. The Court was unanimous, with only Justice Thomas dissenting in part 
declaring the statute unconstitutional. Some observers have wondered why the liberal 
members of the Court joined the Roberts opinion, assisting in casting the shadow that 
engulfed the act since that decision. See Rick Hasen, Are the Liberal Justices Savvy or 
Suckers?, SLATE (July 1, 2013, 2:29 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/07/are_the_liberals_on_the_supreme_court_savvy_
or_suckers.html; Linda Greenhouse, The Cost of Compromise, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR 
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III. 
 
Unlike the plaintiff in NAMUDNO, it is far from clear why Shelby 
County even had standing to bring a facial challenge to the VRA, since it 
was clear that the statute could be constitutionally applied to 
it.35 Where NAMUDNO had no history of discrimination, but was not 
allowed to bail out from coverage because of the wording of the statute, 
Shelby County was not entitled to bail out because the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) had objected to proposed changes submitted by the 
County.36 Rather than resolve those objections in the manner that the statute 
provides, the County filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the 
statute. As Justice Ginsburg’s dissent argued, “even while subject to the 
restraining effect of Section 5, Alabama was found to have ‘deni[ed] or 
abridge[d]’ voting rights ‘on account of race or color more frequently than 
nearly all other states in the Union,”37 and Shelby County and its 
surrounding area were active players in that discrimination. 
Shelby County itself was a defendant in a recent successful suit against 
it alleging that it maintained a discriminatory at-large electoral 
system.38 Shortly after the resolution of that case, a city in Shelby County 
requested preclearance of a districting plan that would have eliminated the 
city’s sole majority-black district that would have been created pursuant to 
the consent decree it had just signed. The DOJ objected to the plan, but the 
city defied the DOJ and implemented the change, causing the DOJ to bring 
a successful lawsuit against the city to restore the seat.39 
In neighboring Jefferson County, the city of Pleasant Grove engaged in 
purposeful discrimination by annexing all-white areas, but refusing to annex 
an adjacent black neighborhood. A federal court concluded that the city had 
shown unambiguous opposition to racial integration, both before and after 
the passage of federal civil rights laws, and that its strategic annexations 
appeared to be an attempt “to provide for the growth of a monolithic white 
voting block for the impermissible purpose of minimizing future black 
voting strength.”40 As Justice Ginsburg noted, the type of manifest racial 
bias evident in this case was even reflected in the personal views of white 
                                                                                                                       
BLOG (July 10, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/the-cost-
of-compromise. 
35 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (“Facial challenges . . . 
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”). 
36 Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2621. 
37 Id. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
38 Dillard v. Crenshaw Cnty., 748 F. Supp. 819 (M.D. Ala. 1990). 
39 See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2646. 
40 Id. 
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members of the Alabama legislature who, as part of an FBI investigation, 
were overheard referring to African-Americans as “Aborigines” as they 
discussed fears of a large African-American voter turnout for a 
referendum.41 
The prevalence of such stark contemporary racism in a covered Section 
5 jurisdiction, literally at the core of what Section 5 was designed to target, 
makes it astonishing that it could have standing to raise a facial challenge to 
the constitutionally of the statute.42 Yet without any acknowledgement of a 
blatantly result-oriented relaxation of the standing rules, Roberts went on to 
cut and paste from his exceedingly deficient 2009 opinion. 
Like NAMUDNO, the Shelby County decision rests on the mystical doctrine 
of “equal sovereignty,” but says very little more to explain what the 
doctrine means than what was said in 2009.43 Indeed, as venerable 
conservative Judge Richard Posner described it, “[t]his is a principle of 
constitutional law of which I had never heard—for the excellent reason that 
. . . there is no such principle …. [t]he opinion rests on air.”44 
 
IV. 
 
Thus, along with its infamous election law companions from the 21st 
century, Bush v. Gore45 and Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,46 five Republican-appointed Supreme Court Justices have 
trounced logic and precedent to produce groundbreaking rulings that have 
no conceivable rationale other than to buttress the national political strength 
                                                
41 Id. at 2647. 
42 The cases are clear. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 24–26 (1960) (finding 
a federal statute proscribing deprivations of the right to vote based on race constitutional as 
applied to the state officials before the Court, even if it could not constitutionally be 
applied to other parties); Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 743 (2003) 
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (“Where, as here, a state or local government raises a facial challenge 
to a federal statute on the ground that it exceeds Congress’ enforcement powers under the 
Civil War Amendments, the challenge fails if the opposing party is able to show that the 
statute “could constitutionally be applied to some jurisdictions.”). 
43 The Court added an additional citation, a 1911 case case, Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 
559 (1911), which, like the cases previously relied upon, shed no light on the 
constitutionality of Section 5, and were sitting dormant in the case books in 1965, as well 
as during the time that the Court upheld previous congressional reauthorizations. As has 
been argued earlier, the facts on the ground have hardly changed so much as to give these 
old cases such new bite. 
44 Richard Posner, The Voting Rights Act Ruling Is About The Conservative 
Imagination, SLATE (June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_court_2013/the_supreme_c
ourt_and_the_voting_rights_act_striking_down_the_law_is_all.html. 
45 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000). 
46 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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of a right-wing Republican Party increasingly focused on destroying Black 
political power and entrenching itself in the political arena.47 
Unlike 1982, when a “bipartisan” Congress amended the VRA to over-
turn a Supreme Court decision demanding a showing of discriminatory 
intent before a plaintiff could prevail on a Section 2 voting rights 
claim,48 the current Congress is far more polarized, and the Republican 
Party has nothing to gain, and all to lose, by “fixing” the problem created by 
the Shelby County decision.49 Indeed, taking advantage of the chaos caused 
by the decision, the very states that were covered by Section 5 have been 
moving rapidly to implement changes that would not have been precleared 
by the DOJ had Section 5 survived.  In almost all of these instances, the 
changes are being pushed by the state Republican Party counterparts to 
those in Congress whose cooperation would be necessary to amend the 
statute.50 Even if serious bipartisan sentiment existed to take on the issue, it 
is not clear what changes, if any, would satisfy the five-Justice majority 
in Shelby County under the purported rationale that underlies the decision. 
Such difficulty in coming up with another formula is the most likely reason 
                                                
47 Cf. Thomas B. Edsell, The Decline of Black Power in the South, N.Y. TIMES 
OPINIONATOR BLOG (July 10, 2013, 9:34 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2013/07/10/the-decline-of-black-power-in-the-south/?nl=opinion&emc=edit_ty_20130711. 
48 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
49 On congressional polarization, see THOMAS MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, IT’S 
EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED 
WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012); John Aloysius Farrell, Divided We Stand, 
National Journal (May 29, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/ 
magazine/divided-we-stand-20120223. On the lack of organized opposition to the 1982 
Amendments, see ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 113 (1987). Many have noted that the Republican Party 
has developed huge gains from majority-minority districts. See, e.g., Ari Berman, How the 
GOP Is Resegregating the South, THE NATION, Jan. 20, 2012, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/article/165976/how-gop-resegregating-
south#axzz2YU7SxtsU (noting that “in virtually every state in the South, at the 
Congressional and state level, Republicans—to protect and expand their gains in 2010—
have increased the number of minority voters in majority-minority districts represented 
overwhelm-ingly by black Democrats while diluting the minority vote in swing or 
crossover districts held by white Democrats” and that in North Carolina, had placed “half 
the state’s black population of 2.2 million people, who vote overwhelmingly for 
Democrats, into a fifth of all legislative and Congressional districts”). 
50 See Chris Kromm, The Voting Rights Act and the Future of Southern Politics, 
FACING SOUTH (June 27, 2013, 5:53 PM), http://www.southernstudies.org/2013/06/the-
voting-rights-act-and-the-future-of-southern-p.html; Ari Berman, Why Are Conservatives 
Trying to Destroy the Voting Rights Act?, THE NATION, Feb. 25, 2013, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/article/172685/why-are-conservatives-trying-destroy-voting-
rights-act#ixzz2ZQi8vjEQ. 
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why Congress did not attempt to do so in 2006.51 So, movement from 
Congress seems quite unlikely at this point.52 
A number of ideas have been put forward that would allow the 
Executive Branch to take action that does not require the acquiescence of 
Congress. One proposal calls for attorneys representing plaintiffs in voting 
rights cases that were awaiting Section 5 preclearance to ask the local U.S. 
District Court where the case is pending and to retain jurisdiction over the 
case under Section 3 of the VRA,53 a rarely used section of the statute 
which gives U.S. district judges authority, in cases where there have been 
findings of 14th and 15th Amendment violations, to retain jurisdiction over 
the case and deny further changes from being implemented if they would 
violate the VRA or the Constitution.54 In cases involving jurisdictions with 
egregious voting histories, this is a mechanism that will allow federal 
judges to perform the work done by the DOJ under Section 5. An obvious 
advantage of this strategy is that it requires no additional resources for the 
plaintiffs and does not require any congressional action.55 
Another proposal would require that the Department of Justice allocate 
to each U.S. Attorney’s office in a jurisdiction covered by Section 5 at least 
one trained U.S. Attorney who would have the responsibility for overseeing 
and responding to proposed changes that would have triggered objections 
under Section 5 and to prepare litigation under Section 2 of the statute, 
where necessary. Once in litigation, the plaintiff could ask for relief under 
Section 3 along with other provisions. Other proposals would extend this 
                                                
51 Issacharaoff, Karlan & Pildes, supra note 27, at 573. 
52 On July 17th the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the Shelby 
County decision in which two Republicans showed up: one, Senator Grassley, left early; 
the other, Senator Cruz, argued that Section 2 was sufficient to deal with voter 
discrimination. The House held a hearing the next day, and one of the reporters present 
afterwards reported that “it looks like some key House Republicans don’t want to be 
known for killing the Voting Rights Act, but they’d be happy with it dead.” Ari 
Melber, Some Republicans Quietly Cheer End of Voting Rights Act, MSNBC, THE CYCLE 
(Jul 18, 2013, 2:40 PM), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/07/18/ republican-hearing-confronts-
voting-rights-act. 
53 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c). 
54 The court would not allow the change unless the court found that “such 
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and 
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color, in contravention of the voting guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2)” of the 
VRA—language which is identical to Section 5. Id. 
55 See Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation 
and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992 (2012); see also Travis Crum, An Effects 
Test Pocket Trigger, ELECTION LAW BLOG (July 8, 2013, 8:36 AM), 
http://electionlawblog.org/?p=52659&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_
campaign=Feed%3A+electionlawblog %2FuqCP+%28Election+Law%29. 
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idea throughout the United States, in essence covering every U.S. 
Attorney’s office.56 This would of course be much more resource intensive. 
A few proposals requiring congressional changes would, for example, 
define coverage jurisdictions as those which have violated federal election 
laws in recent years, capturing many of the problematic Southern 
states;57 create a legislative provision providing a “universal right to 
vote;”58 or follow mandatory disclosure of electoral changes under 
legislation authorized by a similar type of regulation as that existing under 
the Elections Clause of the Constitution.59 
 
V.  
 
It is difficult to be optimistic that the VRA will be fixed by the current 
Congress. What will therefore be necessary is an unusually active DOJ 
working to counter regressive state legislative plans and an active 
population mobilized to utilize the ballot box, among other popular 
initiatives. Working together to change the political complexion of the 
Republican-leaning state governments may bring about necessary changes 
for a better, more accessible political process. 
 
* * * 
 
                                                
56 Professor Lani Guinier initially put forth this idea in a discussion on National Public 
Radio. See Talk of the Nation: What Changes After Supreme Court Ruling On Voting 
Rights Act (NPR radio broadcast June 25, 2013), available at http://www.npr.org/2013/ 
06/25/195557564/what-changes-after-supreme-court-ruling-on-voting-rights-act. 
57 Professor Lani Guinier initially put forth this idea in a discussion on National Public 
Radio. See Talk of the Nation: What Changes After Supreme Court Ruling On Voting 
Rights Act (NPR radio broadcast June 25, 2013), available at http://www.npr.org/ 
2013/06/25/195557564/what-changes-after-supreme-court-ruling-on-voting-rights-act. 
58 Editorial, The Future of Voting Rights, June 29, 2013, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/opinion/sunday/the-future-of-voting-
rights.html?ref=opinion&_r=1&. 
59 See Samuel Issacharoff, So the VRA Is Gutted. Here’s How to Still Fight Voter 
Discrimination, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 28, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/ 
article/113672/voting-rights-act-overturned-how-still-fight-voter-discrimination# (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2013); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and 
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each 
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter 
such Regulations . . . .”). 
 
